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In an essay entitled « Literary History and Literary Modernity» Paul 
de Man attempts once again to define the term « modernity» and to relate it 
to literature - in the process transcending the standard usage of the word 
as a varying description of what happens to be one's own present. De Man 
arrives at the insight that, in reflecting upon the meaning of literary 
modernity, « one is soon forced to resort to paradoxical formulations, such 
as defining the modernity of a literary period as the manner in which it 
discovers the impossibility of being modernl.» The predicament of 
modernity is its inherent irony. De Man, citing Friedrich Nietzsche's 
Thoughts Out of Season (Unzeitgemii{3e Betrachtungen), relates modernity 
to « life », that is : to a spontaneity which can be understood as the radical 
impulse to forget the past in order to fully experience the presentness of the 
present. Considered as a principle of life, however, « modernity becomes a 
principle of origination and turns at once into a generative power that is 
itself historica12. » It is impossible to overcome the past in the name of life, 
because life as action, as an expression of immediacy, must still always be 
concerned with a future that will in turn relegate the meaning of the 
momentary present to the past. 
This ironic condition, taken as the diagnosis of every literary 
movement which - like literary modernism - lays claim to modernity, 
will become intensified when applied to a generation of writers who 
essentially view themselves as « post-modernist. » As an attitude adopted in 
good faith, postmodernism does not free the writer from the pressure of the 
immediate present - as the prefix « post » would imply; instead it forces 
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the writer to acknoledge his own historicity at the same time as he deals with 
the present. The temporal paradox inherent in the term « post-modernism )) 
itself. the denial of the present even as present. mirrors the necessity on the 
writer's part of a linkage of spontaneity with a reflection which, having 
entered the very realm of spontaneity; turns the process of writing as action 
into a permanent struggle for the ever-elusive past as the « real. )) Thus, the 
predicament of the postmodernist writer tends to surface in his ironic 
infatuation with history. The writer. after having become increasingly 
conscious - historicaJly since the days of early Romanticism - of his 
double role as the spontaneous creator and the critical commentator of his 
own text. has come to understand that his constant reflection upon the 
problematical status of the present entails an irrevocable loss of reality. 
lronicaJly. this loss can only be compensated for if the language of the 
historian. which is clearly distinct from the events it denotes, can be made to 
serve the purposes of fiction. It can then become the indirect means, if not 
of gaining immediate access to. then at least of regaining an innocent 
attitude towards reality. 
In 1981 Alan Wilde published a study entitled Horizons of Assent : 
Modernism. Postmodernism and the Ironic Imagination. This study claims 
to be historical. yet it does not consider the ironic relationship between 
literary modernism or postmodernism and history. Indeed, the chapter on 
the postmodernist ironic imagination might be caJled a tacit homage to the 
ahistoricity of the American Dream. For not only does Wilde consider 
post modernism to be a specificaJly American phenomenon, but he 
succeeds - as his title indicates - in introducing affirmation into the very 
realm of negation. ambivalence. paradox, that is : into the realm of irony. 
Wilde caJls his own position « phenomenologicaP. )) By this he means that 
his approach to irony is largely descriptive. He can thus speak. in the plural, 
of « ironies », of ironies as expressions of the « structures of mind and art4. )) 
The three ironies which he detects in 20th-century literature are, one : 
mediate irony. which can be found in pre-modernist times; two: disjunctive 
irony. « the characteristic form of modernism~ II ; three: suspensive irony. 
which Wilde connects with postmodernism. These ironies represent, to 
him. historical movements as weJl as logical categories as well as different 
modes of consciousness. Wilde's lack of conceptual differentiation can. of 
course, be regarded as intentional, as the attempt to give reign to what he 
sees as the empirical evidence and simply to register how various modes of 
consciousness constitute themselves along the lines of the historical 
development of literature. However. if irony is regarded as a mode of 
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consciousness, it must be defined with regard both to its paradoxical 
conditions and its implied historical intentionality before its manifold 
historical shapes can be adequately demonstrated. To do justice to irony we 
may have to presuppose a development of the ironic consciousness that 
corresponds with an exfoliation of the internal tensions implicit in the 
paradox of a conscious past and future-oriented experience of the present, 
independently of external historical developments. 
In researching his dissertation, The Concept of Irony, Soren 
Kierkegaard discovered to his surprise that the term irony seemed to have 
no history. He discovered that since Immanuel Kant, since what can be 
called the (C transcendental crisis» «C transzendentale Wende»), the 
development of self-reflection had within a few decades precipitated 
revolutionary ways of thinking whose germs had lain dormant ever since 
the time of Socrates. This is not to say, of course, that forms and concepts of 
irony cannot be detected in the literature between Plato and Kant - for 
example in the rhetoric of Quintilian - but that those forms and concepts 
of irony were, strictly speaking, secondary: they all reflected an unchanging 
historical deep structure and thus fell short of Socrates' dialectic 
achievement. 
Although Wilde's distinction between three forms of irony appears 
simply to mirror an historical development, the changing mutual 
interpenetration of self and world, he ultimately loses his hold on the term 
itself, which according to his premises would have to be a response to a 
changing environment that is categorically identical to itself. Suspensive 
irony thus becomes, for him, a negative, yet at the same time affirmative, 
response to the (( multiplicity, randomness, contingency, and even 
absurdity» of the postmodernist world6• But irony is not both negative and 
affirmative; it does not, for that matter, always contain its own opposite. If 
that were the case, the only intentionality that could be ascribed to irony 
would be hypocrisy. As it happens, irony regarded as hypocrisy does indeed 
have a long history, going back to the ancient Greek philosopher 
Theophrastus. But if irony were indeed hypocrisy, Socrates would then 
never have employed it as a means to discover Truth, which, to him, could 
never be ambiguous. Wilde's strategy is bound to fail : by infusing the 
supposed negativity of irony with its own opposite, by turning it into (( a 
low-keyed engagement with a world of perplexities and uncertainties7 », 
Wilde not only ultimately substitutes affirmation for negation, but, more 
importantly, mimesis for irony. For just as the self defines its own stance as 
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a reaction to a multiple, uncertain, and fragmented world, so too must the 
self become a mirror of this very world. Thus, the postmodernist world 
might be called ironic, but not the postmodernist self. By implication, irony 
ceases to be a mode of consciousness altogether. If we followed Wilde's 
argument, the ironic shift from modernism to post modernism would be one 
from self to world, not from one mode of consciousness to another. To 
phrase it more pointedly, a shift would have taken place from subjective to 
objective irony - the very distinction Wilde wants to avoid. In other 
words: if irony is a mode of consciousness, then its conditions, modes of 
development, and intentionality have to be described in terms other than 
Wilde's. 
Most importantly, the concept of irony can never be severed from the 
category of time. Irony depends on time as its unalterable condition, yet it 
does so quite independently of its ever becoming historically operative. 
This implies that although irony as a mode of consciousness can be defined 
by laws or, better: rules of the same degree of universality that govern the 
constitution of any mental topology, it will never be all-pervading - as the 
notion of an ironic world would suggest. Also, any objectively ironic world 
has to have been that way all along. The term « absurd II, which the 
existentialist philosophers employed to describe the seIrs paradoxical 
situation between the search for meaning and the experience of a 
meaningless world, would indeed better describe such a state of affairs. The 
problem that evolves, however, if we see time as the necessary condition of 
irony, seems to be that, in spite of being a mode of consciousness, irony is 
never actually concerned with the present, but only with the past and the 
future. No existential crisis, for instance, if it is experienced as such. can be 
met with an ironic spirit, because self-reflection as an integral part of irony 
presupposes a distance from one's own spontaneous impUlses. This 
distance is a distance in time, not simply metaphorically as de Man would 
have its ; it is the experienced approximation of the pure paradox of an 
ironic present that constantly loses its presentness to the past and to the 
future. But one of the main features of the existential crisis is precisely its 
commitment to a present defined by apparent (( timelessness. II 
In trying to analyse the implications of irony's being conditioned by 
time it is important to understand Johann Gottlieb Fichte's interpretation 
of Kant's transcendentalism, because Fichte's philosophy became the 
source of Friedrich Schlegel's subsequent concept of transcendental poetry, 
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which he equated with irony and from which all modern concepts of irony 
ultimately derive. Fichte's concept of transcendental reflection presupposes 
that the ego is the center of every philosophical analysis, because all 
experience is dependent on the possibility of subjective perception. 
Experience he defines as the process in which, through a kind of centrifugal 
impulse, the ego transcends its own limits only in order to return, this time 
through a kind of centripetal impulse, to itself. This dual activity is the 
necessary precondition for the development of consciousness as such. What 
Fichte calls the <ddeal activity» «( reine Tatigkeit») of the ego is an 
underived impulse by means of which - to use Fichte's terminology - the 
ego « posits II itself, defining everything else as a part of itself. This ideal 
activity is the centrifugal impulse and it is absolute. But in order to become 
conscious of itself, the ego has to limit the range of its own ideal activity by 
positing a non-ego, which turns the ideal activity back upon the ego as its 
source. This centripetal process is called self-reflection. Self-reflection is, 
therefore, equivalent to the ego's awareness of definition and finitude and 
is, in itself, painful. However, in thus setting or positing a range for its own 
activity, the ego has in fact limited itselfand can, in reflecting upon the self-
imposed nature of its own definition and finitude, assert its freedom9• 
Thus Fichte's ideal activity, the absolute impulse of the ego, cannot be 
interpreted as an impulse directed towards an ideal, but as an ideal impulse 
whose ideality can nevertheless only be discovered in the process of self-
reflection - when the ego's activity is turned back upon itself as upon its 
own source. Fichte's transcendental reflection therefore becomes identical 
with the experience of inauthenticity at any given moment of the present. 
Hence its irony. For the status of authenticity comes to belong either to an 
irretrievable past or to an unattainable future. In the case of a lost golden 
age, importance must be attached to the idea of the beginning, regarded less 
as a simple reference to a point of departure than as a fall from grace; in the 
case of a utopian future, the ironic series must become paramount, because 
the series as a form of repetition will allow not only for « new» beginnings 
but, at the same time, for the possibility of directing these beginnings 
towards a goal. 
Both forms of irony, the backward-looking and the forward-looking, 
have found unsurpassed philosophical representatives in Kierkegaard and 
Schlegel, respectively; and although Schlegel's concept of irony seems to 
be, on the whole, more important for an understanding of postmodernist 
literature than Kierkegaard's, there are, of course, postmodernist fictions 
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which are more Kierkegaardian. Foremost among these seem to be those of 
Donald Barthelme. Barthelme is deeply influenced by Kierkegaard's work, 
especially by The Concept of Irony; yet in one of his short fictions, in the 
collection City life, entitled « Kierkegaard Unfair to Schlegel II, Barthelme 
seems to take a stand for Schlegel. Kierkegaard, in disapproving of 
Schlegel's novel Lucinde (which actually he seems to have disliked mainly 
for moral reasons), stated that with his poetry Schlegel created a new and 
higher actuality than the historical actuality, in other words : that he 
created a distance between poetry and the world which in the end would 
produce animosity, not the reconciliation poetry should. Kierkegaard does 
not, of course, equate poetry and irony, as Schlegel does, and as Barthelme 
would like to do. Kierkegaard's irony is anything but reconciliatory. Irony, 
for him, is a means for the self to become negatively free, to avoid any 
relationship between the self and the world. In other words: since the ironic 
stance consists in a constant refusal of the self to commit itself to the things 
of the world, it cannot help but define itself negatively as that which is not 
the world. Thus, the ironic self remains purely subjective. Barthelme 
protests against this negative form of ironic subjectivity (he complains that 
Kierkegaard disregards the (e objecthood 10)) of Schlegel's novel), but his 
protest leaves him exhausted and all the more indebted to Kierkegaard, 
because Barthelme does not believe in objective values. He would, however, 
like to believe in positive subjective values. As these also fail him time after 
time, he is forced to believe in nothing more than constant beginnings. Thus 
his admiration for Kierkegaard is certain to grow, since Kierkegaard's 
stance of absolute negativity, which, after the fall from grace, disclaims any 
further chance of recovery of grace, has never failed him : (e Because of 
course Kierkegaard was 'iair" to Schlegel. In making a statement to the 
contrary ... I am trying to annihilate Kierkegaard in order to deal with his 
disa pprovai li . )) 
Kierkegaard's concept of irony refuses to take into account any 
development in time; yet even the absolute negativity of ironic subjectivity 
can no more deny the existence of time than of the things of the world. For 
Schlegel, on the other hand, irony was, basically, a movement in time. In his 
essay ee On the Study of Greek Poetry II (ee Uber das Studium der 
Griechischen Poesie))) Schlegel contrasts ancient and modern times and 
asserts on the basis of their connection, which is really their disjunction, the 
possibility of a future utopian condition of humanity. For him, the accent 
on nature in ancient times is supplanted by an accent on culture in modern 
times. The ancient will to meet the demands of the instinct gives way to the 
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modern predilection to comply with the laws of reason. Thus, culture will 
always belong to a « later» historical period, although no specific historical 
period can lay sole claim to it. Culture produces the ironic attitude, which in 
turn constitutes the decisive feature of modern times. 
Schlegel's concept no longer partakes in the ideas of the 
Enlightenment. He does not claim a necessary progress of humanity for the 
better, only the hope of development. Modern times are tantamount to the 
antithesis of antiquity, which presented a kind of thesis for humanity. This 
contrast between ancient and modern times alone leads Schlegel to the 
assumption of a future synthesis which he hopes will develop organically 
from the spiritual center of the modern mind. The interesting feature of 
Schlegel's argument is, of course, not the all too common notion of three 
successive realms or stages in the development of the human mind -
represented by past, present and future. The crucial point is rather that 
Schlegel seems to believe that the ironic age, in spite of having had to 
incorporate the conditions of its predecessor in order to become ironic in 
the first place, can grow into its own synthesis. This paradox seems to have 
been the reason why Schlegel postulated an « objective poetry» as the goal 
of the ironic age. He believed that on an aesthetic level would be possible 
what on a speculative philosophical level remained impossible : the 
objectification of the radical subjectivity of the ironic self. Schlegel's 
equation of irony with transcendental poetry thus implies no limitation of 
the scope of irony, since the transcendental poetry of modern times would 
progressively become universal in scope. Subjective irony would 
accumulatively achieve its own objectification through the growing self-
reflection of fictional language in the course of a series of poetic renderings 
over time l2 . 
According to Schlegel, the ironic series has the advantage of being a 
continuous thrust into the future while allowing, at the same time, for new 
beginnings. As the further development of the ironic mode of consciousness 
has shown, the ironic series has the disadvantage that the possibility of new 
beginnings will eventually become a necessity and thus prevent both the 
recovery and the attainment of any, even the most tentative, state of grace. 
An ironic fiction can never be anything but a fragment in the presumed 
realm of objective poetry. It must, in fact, be conceived as a fragment; it 
must reflect upon its very limitations as its epistemological condition in 
order to turn the impossibility of a consummate ending into an asset. Yet, in 
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concentrating on its own conditionality, which reveals its fictionality, 
ironic fiction is bound to lose even the appearance of referentiality. The 
tension, therefore, in ironic fiction, is not between fact and fiction, as in 
mimetic literature, but within fiction itself. 
In an essay entitled « Representation and The War For Reality» 
William H. Gass says, « In fiction, the war ... is fought within the word 13. » 
And the newly published section from Gass's novel in progress, The Tunnel. 
appears to demonstrate this point. Alvin Rosenfeld, in his response to The 
Tunnel, which is published along with Gass's texts in the Winter 1982 issue 
of the journal Salmagundi, misses the irony of the novel precisely by 
dealing with it on mimetic grounds. The narrator of The Tunnel, the author 
William Frederick Kohler, an American historian who has written a book 
entitled Guilt and Innocence in Nazi Germany, cannot find the peace he 
sought by writing the book ; for his conscientious research into the 
circumstances of the Holocaust, his sifting of the evidence and his 
compilation of facts « contain everything except the sufferings they 
number l4• » Kohler's experience illustrates the fictional word's ironic loss of 
referentiaIity, because « however we choose to think about it, the fact 
remains that a word is closer to its sense than to its reference1s• » Kohler's 
inability to get close either to reality or to his own inner self, the other side 
of the same coin, mounts to despair over language - which is forever in his 
way, which stares back at him as his own writing whenever, sitting 
permanently at his desk, he lowers his eyes. At the end of The Tunnel the 
lines of the text are interspersed with three words which recur like columns : 
shot, hang, gas, an ironic triad that symbolically seems to condense the 
Holocaust to its quintessence. This is the only passage in The Tunnel that 
affords Rosenfeld some slight relief of his distress over Gass's playful and 
hence « morally questionable » text: « As counterweight to the narrator's 
insurgent imaginings, which become especially strong at the close of "The 
Tunnel", Gass interjects the lethal nouns of annihilation - gas gas gas. shot 
shot shot. hang hang hang - the latter lined up as heavy columns of history 
against the rhetorical leap into ecstasy lb. » But Rosenfeld's relief is iII-
placed. The three words shot. hang. gas. fall like droppings, so to speak, out 
of the words "upshot", "hangings" (referring to window hangings), and 
"gastriloquist". This means that they are not « heavy columns of history » 
which inject themselves into the narrator's text against his will, but that 
they become, on the contrary, the concentrated expression ofthe narrator's 
ineluctable obsession with words. In the narrator's mind words war against 
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words, as the struggle of meanings, especially in gas and gaslriloquisl, 
signifies. (There's probably a pun on the author's name at work too.) The 
narrator loses the war for reality. His desperate question at the end ofthe 
text, « Where, after all, is Germany·7? I), is another expression of his search 
for an ever-receding self, worse: for a self that is already irretrievably lost. 
For just as the narrator could never hope to recapture the reality of the 
Germany he has written about, he loses himself once and forever after a 
moment of love. 
The problematical relation of irony is precisely to history as an 
intractable past. If, in accordance with Fichte's theory, the ego were to posit 
the world as its non-ego and thereby ultimately assert its freedom, then this 
world would not, in the last instance, be alien to the ego. The narrator in 
The Tunnel cannot deal with the Holocaust because he cannot make sense 
of it. This is illustrated by his puns, his limericks (one of them on « a camp 
called Auschwitz fF~I his arrangement of Hebrew and Yiddish names into an 
emblem of the six-pointed star, and by his musings on whether the Jews 
could have met their fate differently. Indeed, he cannot deal with 
Germany's past unless he were ultimately to identify with Adolf Hitler 
himself, who succeeded in turning the history of a Germany which to him 
represented the world into a mirror of his own psycho-history, who 
succeeded, that is, in positing the world as an extension of his ego. This 
paradoxical need on the part of the narrator to identify with Germany's, 
and hence his own, unmaker has the feeling, if not the objectivity of 
tragedy. 
This contention can be corroborated by comparing Gass's fiction with 
Walter Abish's novel How German Is II, which presents a complementary 
problem. The protagonist, Ulrich Hargenau, is also a writer, although not 
an historian, but a novelist. His relationship to language appears to be more 
tranquil than that of the historian, since fictional language allows for the 
metaphorical thematization of his ironic predicament: the unbridgeable 
gulf between the past and the present. Indubitably German, Ulrich is 
presumed to be the son of Ulrich von Hargenau, who was executed for his 
involvement in the 1944 plot against Hitler. Ulrich is haunted not only by 
the image of the heroic father, but by the repressed doubt that he may not be 
his father's son after all, but the son of the waiter Franz, who was a servant 
in the house of the von Hargenaus at the time of Ulrich's birth. Franz is an 
eternal fascist who in his spare time works on a model of the concentration 
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camp which once stood on the site of the new town of Brumholdstein. 
Brumholdstein is named after the philosopher Brumhold, a cryptonym for 
Heidegger. His uncertain heritage forces Ulrich to shun history and to 
depend on fictional language in order to form an image of himself. But the 
linguistic freedom ultimately means the self-denial of the writer as subject. 
It is not without cause that Ulrich shares his first name with Robert Musil's 
Man Without Qualities. Although Ulrich is the writer of the family, it is 
nevertheless his older brother Helmuth, a weIl-known architect, who is 
asked to give a speech in Brumholdstein at a memorial service in 
commemoration of Brumhold's death. 
In speaking of Brumhold, said Helmuth. In speaking of a man I greatly 
admire, I am also, to a degree, explaining or attempting to explain 
Germany ... Each year, several hundred thousand foreigners come to 
explore, and also enjoy, Germany ... But how can they possibly 
understand Germany without appreciating the richness of its 
language, for only the language will enable them to comprehend the 
nature of that German restlessness and that intrinsic German striving 
for order and for tranquillity as well as for perfection ... While on the 
one hand we cannot very well separate our understanding of existence 
from our understanding of history, from the specificity of historical 
events, we can comprehend with Brumhold that his search for 
meaning, this metaphysical quest for Dasein is not linked to this or 
that event, to one year or another (after all, we are not more or less 
German because ofthe events of 1914 or 1945, to take two years more 
or less at random), but to a universal history, a history of human 
awareness ... Whatever the outcome, Brumhold has enabled us to see 
ourselves as we truly are lB • 
Helmuth historicizes Heidegger's philosophy in an attempt less to 
understand it than to effect its general acceptance. His logically false, but 
rhetorically valid assumption is that, since Brumhold's philosophy deals 
with general matters in a specific national language, this specific language 
in tum can be claimed to yield universal truths to those initiated into its 
intricacies. The obvious irony of Helmuth's speech consists in the fact that 
any specific national language will be influenced by the specific history and 
the specific character traits of a people (if we concede that there are 
character traits common to all members of a people), just as language will, 
in tum, influence national history and national character. Thus any 
language's claim to express universal truths is in itself dubious. Yet the final 
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- an~ probably unwitting - irony of Helmuth's statements consists in the 
fact that Heidegger did indeed aspire to universal truth through an 
historical language and that his appraisal of the historical events of his time 
therefore became as undifferentiated and as questionable as Helmuth's 
own. Still, Ulrich can never succeed in trying to escape from history into 
fictional language, since his language happens to be German. He hopes that 
the self-sufficiency of fictional language will prove a defense against the 
past or, for that matter, against national character traits. However, he has 
already become entangled in a national language which, constantly made to 
serve ideologies posing as ideas, claimed this self-sufficiency as its historical 
birthright; and far from overcoming its historical past through integration 
into « a history of human awareness II, the present language reveals nothing 
but its own forgetfulness, the impossibility of that « new II awareness whose 
main trait would have to be the same ambivalence represented in Ulrich's 
ambivalent heritage. Instead of succeeding, through his role as a writer, in 
breaking free from his own history as well as from that of his people, Ulrich 
appears as their present ironic representative. As a consequence he 
experiences a similar feeling of tragic inevitability as the narrator of Gass's 
fiction. 
Tragedy had to become ironic in postmodernist times. Todd Andrews, 
in John Barth's novel LEITERS, writes in a letter to the Author, who is 
one of the characters of the novel: « Only the Tragic View will do, and it not 
very satisfactorily. Must one take the tragic view of the Tragic View l9 ? II 
And the Author concurs in his reply: « When I have a view of things at all, it 
is just your sort of tragic view - of history, of civilizations and institutions, 
of personal destinies20• )) Two details appear to be particularly noteworthy 
in this exchange of opinions. One: there is a striking parallel between what 
Schlegel calls, in his essay « On Incomprehensibility II «( Uber die 
Unverstandlichkeit I», the (c irony of irony21 ,), by which he means irony 
taken even as irony, and Andrews's « tragic view of the Tragic View.») 
Two: Andrews and the Author do not talk about tragedy, but about the 
Tragic View, that is: a mode of consciousness. Since the tragic has ceased to 
document, as it did particularly for Georg W.F. Hegel, the insurmountable 
chasm between objective and subjective values - that is : since the tragic 
self has learned to reflect upon its own conditionality as a tragic disposition 
-, tragedy has become an ironic dilemma. The irresolvable double bind 
between equally acknowledged yet conflicting values, which according to 
Hegel mark the tragic situation for the tragic hero, has resolved into the 
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experience of the ironic series as the aggravated experience of the 
insufficiency of both self-assertion and self-denial. Taking the tragic view of 
the Tragic View means that the bero, instead of dying in the hope to 
reconcile subjective and objective values, must learn to accept tragedy as a 
paradoxical principle. The new beginnings which constitute the possibility 
of the ironic series are not truly (( new» in the sense of (( original» ; instead 
they mean the repeated approach of the ironic self towards history as the 
tragically elusive past, towards irretrievable (( civilizations and 
institutions» as well as (( personal destinies. » Yet although each approach 
will be necessarily abortive and therefore leave the self with a greater sense 
of inauthenticity, rekindling the desire for what might have been the 
authentic experience, the struggle with history will nevertheless assume the 
status of a ritual which must be enacted again and again in the attempt to 
absorb the past into the realm of experience. Thus the ironic self seeks to 
achieve a paradoxical fusion of objective tradition and subjective 
spontaneity, whose ultimate tragedy consists in the experience of time as an 
ironic principle. 
This irony of irony is at the heart of LEITERS. (( In the late afternoon 
of our century if not of our civilization22 » the novel's (( seven fictitious drolls 
and dreamers each of which imagines himself factual » consciously reenact 
the former stages of their lives. Their ambitious aim is to transcend 
tradition through spontaneity. But this goal can only be achieved by those 
who ultimately posit fiction as an expression of the imagination's freedom 
in the face of fact: Lady Amherst, whose child, conceived against all odds, 
will in a sense be the novel LEITERS itself; Ambrose Mensch, who is the 
((author» of the child; and John Barth, who is the author of both Lady 
Amherst and Ambrose Mensch. Ambrose, obsessed with reenacting every 
detail of his former life, represents the past, Lady Amherst the future. and 
Barth the present. But as Author with a capital (( A», that is : as a character 
within the novel, John Barth shuns the present. He evades communication 
with the other two characters, who represent the author-reader-
relationship as a love affair : he remains aloof from Ambrose Mensch 
almost throughout the book and he only writes to Lady Amherst in the 
beginning. Comparably, the present is only evoked in the beginning and at 
the very end of the book, in two letters from (( The Author to the Reader» : 
(( LEITERS is "now" begun» and LEITERS is "now" ended. » The second 
letter is dated (( "Sunday, September 14. 1969"» and it reads: (( LEITERS 
reaches herewith and "now" the end. » The word now is modified by a two-
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page parenthesis which refers to the dates when Barth first outlined this last 
letter «((Tuesday, July 4,1978») ; when he drafted it in longhand 
«((Monday, July 10, 1978»); when he typed it «((OctoberS, 1978»); and 
when the reader reads it «(( [supply dote23] »). Each of these authorial 
presents is thus modified by the past as represented by the official date of 
the letter, which relates to the action described in the course of LETTERS, 
and by the future as represented by the reader's reading of the novel. 
Fictional authorial presence is always ironic; it disappears into either the 
life of the characters or the life ofthe reader, into the past or into the future. 
Yet the author's imagination determines the logical and aesthetic rules 
according to which the novel is to be understood; and this understanding 
constitutes the loving response of the reader. Gass says in «( Representation 
and The War For Reality» : « Had God had the wit of Henry James or 
Alfred North Whitehead, He would have done better by US24.» The world of 
the word is to be preferred to the world of facts. This view becomes the 
theme of Stanley Elkin's novel The Living End. Here God Himselfassumes 
the role of ultimate artist, creating the world as a place of hope and despair 
because it would make for a better story. And He annihilates this very 
world in the end (( because I never found My audience25.» God's main 
concern, however, is with power, not with love. His overwhelming desire to 
be understood is the paradoxical expression of divine loneliness that results 
from a contempt for His own creatures, who are dependent upon His will. 
Of course we know that God breathed His own spirit into Adam, but Gass's 
remark seems to imply that some human beings have improved upon that 
divine spirit beyond God's possible expectations. For God the world's time 
will remain an unchangeable present unless it is abolished as such; while the 
human ironic spirit is always oriented towards a past and a future. 
Understanding, then, does not mean the ability to decipher signals which 
are being transmitted - an erroneous opinion Omnipotence would be 
inclined to hold. The Living End is a comic tour de force to prove that 
human beings are only too well equipped not only to decipher, but to 
interpret God's signals. Instead, understanding means the mutual 
acknowledgement of the logical and aesthetic rules by which the ironic self 
transforms the implications of the past into the conditions of the future. 
This understanding can only be momentary, because the ironic self 
ultimately always returns to the ego as its source. Yet,just as two parallels 
extending infinitely into space will finally meet, the ironic self approaches 
understanding as its objective, albeit infinitely removed goal, because to the 
ironic mind each act of self-reflection also serves to clarify its further course 
of action. 
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